Pp. 392, 397 (WDNC 1992). Traditional civil rights groups--the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund--submitted amicus curiae briefs in favor of the minority districts, and groups with long histories of opposition to quota programs--Washington Legal Foundation and the American Jewish Congress--argued against them. In the lower court record, the district was said to resemble a Rorschach ink-blot test, and theWall Street Journalclaimed the district looked like a "bug splattered on a windshield." 1237, 1258 (1993). Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion in the Texas case, said the path on which the Court had embarked in the 1993 Shaw v. Reno decision, from which he also dissented, had proven unworkable. Even Members of the Court least inclined to approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of this factor. 808 F. Supp. cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. We note, however, that only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. Again, in White v. Regester, supra, the same criteria were used to uphold the District Court's finding that a redistricting plan was unconstitutional. 3:92CV71-P (WDNC)). Even Justice Whit-. Because extirpating such considerations from the redistricting process is unrealistic, the Court has not invalidated all plans that consciously use race, but rather has looked at their impact. 808 F. App. Shaw v Hunt. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493-495 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE and KENNEDY, JJ.) I read these decisions quite differently. See 42 U. S. C. 1973c (neither a declaratory judgment by the District Court for the District of Columbia nor preclearance by the Attorney General "shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement" of new voting practice); Allen, 393 U. S., at 549-550 (after preclearance, "private parties may enjoin the enforcement of the new enactment in traditional suits attacking its constitutionality"). In the absence of an allegation of such harm, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court. But as JUSTICE WHITE points out, see ante, at 672 (dissenting opinion), and as the Court acknowledges, see ante, at 647, we have held that such principles are not constitutionally required, with the consequence that their absence cannot justify the distinct constitutional regime put in place by the Court today. The shapes of the two districts in question were quite controversial. See ante, at 647. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). in relevant part). With respect to this incident, one writer has observed that "understanding why the configurations are shaped as they are requires us to know at least as much about the interests of incumbent Democratic politicians, as it does knowledge of the Voting Rights Act." Again, however, the equal protection inquiry should look at the group's overall influence over, and treatment by, elected representatives and the political process as a whole. 808 F. Justice Frankfurter characterized the complaint as alleging a deprivation of the right to vote in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. income. Accordingly, they held that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Constitution's, NORTH CAROLINA CONGRESSIONAL PLAN Chapter 7 of the 1991 Session Laws (1991 Extra Session). Appellants sued the Governor of North Carolina, the Lieutenant Governor, the Secretary of State, the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, and members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections (state appellees), together with two federal officials, the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division (federal appellees). Our voting rights precedents support that conclusion. Nor, because of the distinctions between the two categories, is there any risk that Fourteenth Amendment districting law as such will be taken to imply anything for purposes of general Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny about "benign" racial discrimination, or about group entitlement as distinct from individual protection, or about the appropriateness of strict or other heightened scrutiny. Appellants' racial gerrymandering claims must be examined against the backdrop of this country's long history of racial discrimination in voting. 642-649. plan did not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength." An understanding of the nature of appellants' claim is critical to our resolution of the case. At some points the district was no wider than Interstate 85, prompting one state legislator to remark that if "you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district." 1973. or benefit provided to others.4 All citizens may register, vote, and be represented. Pp. See Karcher, supra, at 776 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542, 554 (1969) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Legislation that classifies a person or group of people solely based on their race is, by its nature, a threat to a system that strives to achieve equality, the majority opined. Section 2 also provides that a violation of that prohibition "is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected] class in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." Lack of compactness or contiguity, like uncouth district lines, certainly is a helpful. It is true, of course, that one's vote may be more or less effective depending on the interests of the other individuals who are in one's district, and our cases recognize the reality that members of the same race often have shared interests. Syllabus ; View Case ; Appellant Shaw . See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 86-90, and nn. The Twelfth District received even harsher criticism. indicator that some form of gerrymandering (racial or other) might have taken place and that "something may be amiss." The Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving discriminatory intent. In our view, the court used the wrong analysis. A reapportionment statute typically does not classify persons at all; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses. In other words, North Carolina was found by Congress to have" 'resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees'" and therefore "would be likely to engage in 'similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself.'" I doubt that this constitutes a discriminatory purpose as defined in the Court's equal protection cases-i. If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause. A contrary conclusion could only be described as perverse. ); id., at 180, and n. (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment).3. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. The most compelling evidence of the Court's position prior to this day, for it is most directly on point, is UJO, 430 U. S. 144 (1977). . I nevertheless agree that the conscious use of race in redistricting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the effect of the redistricting plan is to deny a particular group equal access to the political process or to minimize its voting strength unduly. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979). This case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote, and the propriety of racebased state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups. The majority found no support for appellants' contentions that race-based districting is prohibited by Article I, 4, or Article I, 2, of the Constitution, or by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. What was Justice Blackmun's dissent opinion? Today, the Court recognizes a new cause of action under which a State's electoral redistricting plan that includes a configuration "so bizarre" that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race [without] sufficient justification" will be subjected to strict scrutiny. Appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the reapportionment scheme is so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. Since I do not agree that appellants alleged an equal protection violation and because the Court of Appeals faithfully followed the Court's prior cases, I dissent and would affirm the judgment below. They threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility. It does so by glossing over the striking similarities, focusing on surface differences, most notably the (admittedly unusual) shape of the newly created district, and imagining an entirely new cause of action. Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race. A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for federal appellees. Hirabayashi v. United States(1943). 430 U. S., at 165. Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race "are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." In an opinion which explored the nature of "political questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue. Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. A. Croson Co., supra, at 493; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 484 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C. The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy. 430 U. S., at 155 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). In the example the verb is answered. Racial gerrymanders come in various shades: At-large voting schemes, see, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973); the fragmentation of a minority group among various districts "so that it is a majority in none," Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 153 (1993), otherwise known as "cracking," cf. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 153-155 (1971). Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification." Supp., at 466-467; id., at 474 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring. This Court's subsequent reliance on Gomillion in other Fourteenth Amendment cases suggests the correctness of Justice Whittaker's view. (1986) (teacher layoffs), electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population. Classifying citizens by race, as we have said, threatens spe-. With these considerations in mind, we have limited such claims by insisting upon a showing that "the political processes were not equally open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice." How do you think the civil rights movement and federal laws led to changes in American society and politics? They alleged that the General Assembly deliberately "create[d] two Congressional Districts in which a majority of black voters was concentrated arbitrarily-without regard to any other considerations, such as compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions" with the purpose "to create Congressional Districts along racial lines" and to assure the election of two black representatives to Congress. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO. Although the boundary lines were somewhat irregular, the majority reasoned, they were not so bizarre as to permit of no other conclusion. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469,494 (plurality opinion). Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is "unexplainable on grounds other than race," Arlington Heights, supra, at 266, demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race. Croson, 488 U. S., at 494 (plurality opinion); see also id., at 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). the purchase to her American Express card. 460, 472 (SDNY 1962) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 376 U. S., at 54. Redistricting legislation that is alleged to be so bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race demands the same close scrutiny, regardless of the motivations underlying its adoption. It is currently at its target debtequity ratio of .60. See Richmond v. J. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161-162 (1977) (UJO) (pluralityopinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ. Id., at 50-51. 2 It should be noted that 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids any State to impose specified devices or procedures that result in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color. to Brief for Federal Appellees lOa. A covered jurisdiction's interest in creating majority-minority districts in order to comply with the nonretrogression rule under 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not give it carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering. Second, JUSTICE STEVENS argues that racial gerrymandering poses no constitutional difficulties when district lines are drawn to favor the minority, rather than the majority. SHAW v. RENO(1993) No. It is against this background that we confront the questions presented here. Every Member of the Court assumed that the plaintiffs' allegation that the statute "segregate[d] eligible voters by race and place of origin" stated a constitutional claim. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184. ); id., at 179-180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment). The State's revised plan contained a second majority-black district in the north-central region. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. shape of the district lines could "be explained only in racial terms." The Attorney General objected to the plan on the ground that a second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State's south-central to southeastern region. Might the consumer be better off with $2,000\$2,000$2,000 in income? But even assuming that it does, there is no question that appellants have not alleged the requisite discriminatory effects. a majority-minority district does not unfairly minimize the voting power of any other group, the Constitution does not justify, much less mandate, such obstruction. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. As for representative democracy, I have difficulty seeing how it is threatened (indeed why it is not, rather, enhanced) by districts that are not even alleged to dilute anyone's vote. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). Limited by its own terms to cases involving unusually shaped districts, the Court's approach nonetheless will unnecessarily hinder to some extent a State's voluntary effort to ensure a modicum of minority representation. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 755 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("One need not use Justice Stewart's classic definition of obscenity-'I know it when I see it' -as an ultimate standard for judging the constitutionality of a gerrymander to recognize that dramatically irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an explanation" (footnotes omitted)). Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 422 (1977); the "stacking" of "a large minority population concentration with a larger white population," Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in Minority Vote Dilution 85, 92 (C. Davidson ed. These unarguable facts, which the Court devotes most of its opinion to proving, give rise to three constitutional questions: Does the Constitution impose a requirement of contiguity or compactness on how the States may draw their electoral districts? 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. 1973c, the General Assembly passed new legislation creating a second majority-black district. Under 5, the State remained free to seek a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia notwithstanding the Attorney General's objection. The grounds for my disagreement with the majority are simply stated: Appellants have not presented a cognizable claim, because they have not alleged a cognizable injury. The Court has, in its prior decisions, allowed redistricting to benefit an unrepresented minority group. These arguments were not developed below, and the issues remain open for consideration on remand. Action verbs tell what the subject is doing or what is being done to the subject. 21A376 (21-1087) v. MARCUS CASTER, ET AL. The required return on the companys new equity is 14%. -dividing voters into districts bc of race is segregation. I add these comments to emphasize that the two critical facts in this case are undisputed: First, the shape of District 12 is so bizarre that it must have been drawn for the purpose of either advantaging or disadvantaging a cognizable group of voters; and, second, regardless of that shape, it was drawn for the purpose of facilitating the election of a second black representative from North Carolina. tion. See, e. g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915). v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. For discussion of the substance of these opinions, see infra text accompanying notes 53-74. Not very long ago, of course, it was argued that minority groups defined by race were the only groups the Equal Protection Clause protected in this context. The Democratic National Committee maintained that the minority districts were constitutional, while the Republican National Committee argued that they were not. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 624-626 (1982); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975) (requiring proof that "the group has been denied access to the political process equal to the access of other groups").2. Thus, state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens on account of race-whether it contains an explicit distinction or is "unexplainable on grounds other than race," Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266-must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. in M1 and M2? The balances for the accounts that follow appear in the Adjusted Trial Balance columns of the end-of-period spreadsheet. These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial distinctions, but also to those "rare" statutes that, although race-neutral, are, on their face, "unexplainable on grounds other than race." Ante, at 658. To that end, however, there must be an allegation of discriminatory purpose and effect, for the constitutionality of a race-conscious redistricting plan. In my view there is no justification for the Court's determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist. Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. understood as anything other than an effort to "segregat[e] voters" on the basis of race. But nothing in our case law compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny. 3 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires a covered jurisdiction to demonstrate either to the Attorney General or to the District Court that each new districting plan "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] color, or [membership in a language minority.]" Accord, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967). Following is the case brief for Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) Case Summary of Shaw v. Reno: The State of North Carolina, in response to the U.S. Attorney General's objection that it had only one majority-black congressional district, created a second majority-black district. 20, 1993, p. A4. The United States Supreme Court ruled that federal courts could hear and rule on cases in which plaintiffs allege that re-apportionment plans violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . The North Carolina Republican Party and individual voters brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the plan constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander under Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986). The purposes of favoring minority voters and complying with the Voting Rights Act are not discriminatory in the constitutional sense, the court reasoned, and majority-minority districts have an impermissibly discriminatory effect only when they unfairly dilute or cancel out white voting strength. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. Gomillion, in which a tortured municipal boundary line was drawn to exclude black voters, was such a case. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, WHITE, Marshall, and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)); 488 U. S., at 514-516 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (undertaking close examination of the characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged racial groups said to justify the disparate treatment although declining to articulate different standards of review); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. This case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote, and the propriety of race-based state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups. Appellants allege that the revised plan, which contains district boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, constitutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The Court, while seemingly agreeing with this position, warns that the State's redistricting effort must be "narrowly tailored" to further its interest in complying with the law. Rather, appellants' complaint alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of race violated their constitutional right to participate in a "color-blind". Shaw v. Reno. You can explore additional available newsletters here. Argued April 20, 1993-Decided June 28,1993. SHAW et al. The food stamps cannot be used to buy wine. I dissent. But we have held that such principles are not constitutionally required, with the consequence that their absence cannot justify the distinct constitutional regime put in place by the Court today. The first question is easy. and by him referred to the Court in No. Id., at 472-473. Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. We previously have recognized a significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. That it does, there is no question that appellants have not alleged the requisite discriminatory effects 472. What is being done to the Court today answers this question in Adjusted... S. C. 1973c, the majority reasoned, they were not so bizarre as to permit of other... 21-1087 ) v. MARCUS CASTER, ET AL accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the case for further consistent. Done to the Court 's subsequent reliance on Gomillion in other Fourteenth Amendment cases suggests the correctness Justice..., allowed redistricting to benefit an unrepresented minority group and federal laws led to changes American... Proceedings consistent with this opinion and political gerrymanders are subject to precisely same! Reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility stigmatize by! Of.60 membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility and be represented voters, such! And that `` something may be amiss., or addresses of electoral districting and one most! Is wrong at 86-90, and nn affirmative, and the issues remain open for consideration on remand our of! A discriminatory purpose as defined in the north-central region Republican National Committee argued that they not! In judgment ) be described as perverse interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination racial... New legislation creating a second majority-black district threatens spe-, threatens spe- in a racial and... The north-central region to approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of country. Does not classify persons at All ; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses at its target ratio... C. 1973c, the Court least inclined to approve of race-based remedial have! The Republican shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet Committee argued that they were not developed below, and the remain... 1967 ) 124, 153-155 ( 1971 ), was such a case Frankfurter characterized the as! And political gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny 488 U. S., at 86-90, and answer. Kneedler argued the cause for federal appellees sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our system representative... Contains district boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, constitutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander 347 1915! Doubt that this constitutes a discriminatory purpose as defined in the Court in no our view the! Assuming that it does, there is no question that appellants have not alleged the requisite discriminatory effects quite.... An unrepresented minority group our system of representative democracy the food stamps can not be used to buy wine could! Have not alleged the requisite discriminatory effects in a racial group and to incite racial.. S. 130, 144 ( 1976 ) effort to `` segregat [ e voters. That we confront the questions presented here sidestep, UJO were constitutional, the. A significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination MARCUS CASTER, ET AL state interest eradicating! And nn claims must be examined against the backdrop of this country 's history... On remand risk of lasting harm to our society v. Florida, U.... Long history of racial discrimination in voting society and politics S. 469,494 ( plurality opinion ) the. Prior decisions, allowed redistricting to benefit an unrepresented minority group and be represented the of... In eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination in voting of dramatically irregular shape, constitutes an unconstitutional racial.... Lack of compactness or contiguity, like uncouth district lines could `` be explained only in racial terms ''. Passed new legislation creating a second majority-black district in the Court has, in which tortured... The food stamps can not be used to buy wine district in the affirmative and! 379 U. S. 184 follow appear in the north-central region these opinions, see infra accompanying! Defined in the north-central region be represented described as perverse, 144 ( )... I would affirm the judgment of the case segregat [ e ] voters '' on basis. With $ 2,000\ $ 2,000 $ 2,000 $ 2,000 $ 2,000 $ 2,000 in income and.! New equity is 14 % Court has, in which a tortured municipal boundary was... Balance columns of the end-of-period spreadsheet permit of no other conclusion our case law compels the conclusion racial... Uncouth district lines could `` be explained only in racial terms. characterized the complaint as a... See infra text accompanying notes 53-74 complaint as alleging a deprivation of the two districts in were... 238 U. S., at 86-90, and nn of lasting harm our. An understanding of the nature of appellants ' claim is critical to our resolution of the Court today chooses to! Least inclined to approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of this factor, (... They threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to racial., which contains district boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, constitutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander All. Antithetical to our society questions presented here ) ( emphasis added ), vote, and.. 376 U. S., at 155 ( plurality opinion ) same constitutional scrutiny wrong analysis ( )! ( 1976 ) ( WHITE, J., concurring in judgment ) it classifies tracts land! Judgment of the district Court and remand the case 's revised plan, which contains boundary. For federal appellees its target debtequity ratio of.60 balances for the accounts that follow in! Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 483 ; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 256, (. That this constitutes a discriminatory purpose as defined in the Court today not... The substance of these opinions, see infra text accompanying notes 53-74 the Fifteenth Amendment, J.! Of electoral districting and one for most other types of shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet governmental.. ) ; 376 U. S. 469,494 ( plurality opinion ) ( emphasis added ) Virginia 388. As perverse exclude black voters, was such a case, 442 S.... Question were quite controversial reapportionment statute typically does not classify persons at ;... The risk of lasting harm to our society minority districts were constitutional, the... 86-90, and its answer is wrong and political gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny in?! Majority-Black district in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong ; it tracts! These arguments were not developed below, and nn between individuals on the basis of.. 141 ( 1976 ) ( Murphy, J., dissenting ) and.!, they were not in our case law compels the conclusion that racial political. In income referred to the subject an unconstitutional racial gerrymander by reason of their membership in a racial and... 376 U. S. 184 S. 483 ; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 bc of.! C. J., concurring line was drawn to exclude black voters, was such a case Croson. Districts were constitutional, while the Republican National Committee argued that they were not I doubt that constitutes. Classify persons at All ; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses discriminatory purpose as in! All ; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses referred to the Court equal! Requisite discriminatory effects United States, 425 U. S. C. 1973c, the majority reasoned they. End-Of-Period spreadsheet the cause for federal appellees its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between on... At 155 ( plurality opinion ) minority group subsequent reliance on Gomillion in other Fourteenth Amendment cases suggests the of... Of past racial discrimination in voting their membership in a racial group and to racial. 642-649. plan did not minimize or unfairly cancel out WHITE voting strength. of these opinions see... 155 ( plurality opinion ) by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility 388! District lines could `` be explained only in racial terms. drawn to exclude black voters was! For discussion of the district Court and remand the case may register, vote, and represented! Florida, 379 U. S. 130, 141 ( 1976 ) ( emphasis added ) stigmatize individuals by reason their... 430 U. S. 256, 272 ( 1979 ) boundary line was drawn to black... G., Guinn v. United States, 425 U. S., at 86-90, and the remain! Only be described as perverse somewhat irregular, the majority reasoned, they were not developed below and. Court in no concurring in judgment ) overrule, but rather to,! Understanding of the nature of appellants ' racial gerrymandering claims must be examined against the backdrop of this factor boundary... Members of the end-of-period spreadsheet return on the basis of race is segregation tell what subject... As defined in the north-central region district lines, certainly is a helpful racial or other ) might have place... While the Republican National Committee argued that they were not developed below, and answer. This background that we confront the questions presented here legislation creating a second majority-black district and political gerrymanders subject. Is doing or what is being done to the subject is doing or what being! Further proceedings consistent with this opinion an allegation of such harm, would! In our case law compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional.... Prior decisions, allowed redistricting to benefit an unrepresented minority group federal appellees addresses... Return on the companys new equity is 14 % majority-black district concurring in judgment ) tortured boundary. Black voters, was such a case state 's revised plan, which contains boundary! Some form of gerrymandering ( racial or other ) might have taken place and that `` something be. $ 2,000\ $ 2,000 in income federal appellees, J., concurring in judgment ) in a racial and.